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In their comment, Dell and O ’Seaghdha (1991) adduced any effect on phonological probes for 
semantic alternatives to the activation o f  these probes in the lexical network. We argue that that 
interpretation is false and, in addition, that the model still cannot account for our data. Further­
more, and different from Dell and O ’Seaghda, we adduce semantic rebound to the lemma level, 
where it is so substantial that it should have shown up in our data. Finally, we question the function 
of feedback in a lexical network (other than eliciting speech errors) and discuss Dell’s (1988) notion 
of a unified production-comprehension system.
Until recently, models of lexical access in speech production 
were almost exclusively based on speech error data. This is true 
both for the modular two-stage models and for the interactive 
connectionist models of lexical access. Both kinds of models 
were initially designed to account for the distributions of natu­
rally observed or experimentally elicited speech errors. From 
the start, however, they were conceived as process models of 
normal speech production. Therefore, the ultimate test of such 
models cannot lie in their account of infrequent derailments of 
the process. Rather, the proof of their efficacy should be sought 
in the account of the normal process itself. An exclusively error- 
based approach to lexical access in speech production is as 
ill-conceived as an exclusively illusion-based approach in vision 
research. One should, of course, hope that an ultimate theory of 
the normal process also has the potential of explaining ob­
served error distributions (or visual illusions, for that matter), 
but it should not be one’s main concern.
In our earlier article (Levelt et al., 1991) we tried to take the 
process aspect of existing models seriously, and we developed a 
reaction time paradigm that allowed us to trace the time course 
of semantic and phonological activation in normal lexical ac­
cess.1 We used this paradigm to compare two kinds of theories: 
discrete two-stage theories and connectionist network theories. 
The latter kind was further partitioned into forward-only
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spreading networks and forward-and-backward spreading net­
works. Dell’s (1986, 1988) theory is an activation-spreading 
theory of the latter kind; it is, moreover, the most explicit and 
the only quantified connectionist model of lexical access in 
existence. It should, therefore, have been no surprise that Dell’s 
theory was a target of much attention in our article. The process 
aspects of other connectionist models are not as well spelled out 
and hence are less accessible to experimental testing.
What we found was, first, that all our data were in full agree­
ment with the predictions of the two-stage theory. It holds that 
lexical selection strictly precedes phonological encoding and, 
in particular, that only the selected item becomes phonologi- 
cally encoded. The theory also excludes feedback from phono­
logical encoding to lexical selection.
Second, we found that our data were not in obvious agree-
1 Although our picture-naming task is, on all accounts, certainly a 
“norm al” lexical accessing task, one can disagree about how “normal” 
our dual task (lexical decision during naming) is. The task is obviously 
not daily practice for most people, but we do believe that until the 
moment o f  probe presentation, our subjects were involved in normal 
lexical access. There is as yet no reason to doubt that our method 
measures the normal state of activation at the moment o f  probing. The 
problem with dual tasks is not so much their normality but the neces­
sity to work with an explicit model o f  the dual task—that is, a model of 
the interaction between the normal process and the probing task. As 
Gary Dell mentioned to us, the data-theory link is more direct in 
single-task situations involving normal error-free speech (such as nam ­
ing latency measurement).
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ment with the connectionist models. They all predict phonolo­
gical activation of items that are semantically coactivated with 
the target, and we found no trace of that. Models (such as DelFs) 
that allow for backward spreading of activation moreover pre­
dict a semantic rebound after phonological activation; no trace 
of that was found either. In their comment, Dell and 
O’Seaghdha (1991) take up these two points one by one, and our 
reply follows the same order.2
The Phonological Activation of Semantic Alternatives
In our General Discussion, we commented on our negative 
finding on the phonological activation of semantic alternatives 
as follows:
Although our negative evidence is clearly supportive o f  the latter 
notion [i.e., the two-stage theory], one cannot a priori exclude the 
possibility that a connectionist account can be reconciled with 
this finding. One should choose the model’s parameters in such a 
way that the phonological activation o f  the target becomes sub­
stantially stronger than the phonological activation of its semantic 
associates or competitors (p. 140). But, we added, there are limits. 
“A nonnegligible phonological activation of semantic alternatives 
is, for instance, necessary to handle the occurrence of mixed 
errors (such as oyster for lobster)” (p. 140).
In their reply, Dell and O ’Seaghdha (1991) precisely follow this 
line. They argue that if the target word (e.g., sheep) is activated by 
the picture to value 1.0 and a semantic alternative (e.g., goat) to 
value s ^  1, then an item that is phonologically related to the 
semantic alternative (e.g., goal) will be activated to the extent 5 */ i f  
feedback through the phonological level has value ƒ  < 1. This they 
call mediated priming. However, a word that is both semantically 
and phonologically related to the target (e.g., steed) will be acti­
vated to the amount s + f  This they call convergent priming. When 
s and ƒ  are both substantially smaller than 1 (e.g., when both are
0.2), the difference in activation is substantial. This would ac­
count for both the occurrence of a relatively high rate o f  mixed 
errors and the absence o f  measurable phonological activation of 
semantic alternatives.
This argument, however, assigns our findings entirely to the 
activation produced by our picture stimuli. It presupposes that the 
explanations for both our negative findings with respect to phono­
logical activation of semantic alternatives (such as goat) and the 
occurrence o f  mixed errors (such as steed) should be based on the 
activation the network produces at the word level in response to the 
picture.
The mixed error (such as steed) arises through convergent prim­
ing of the corresponding word node; any effect for the phonologi­
cally related test probe (such as goal) in our task is caused by the 
mediated priming that this word receives from the picture. But 
whereas the occurrence of a mixed error should indeed be so ex­
plained, our experimental finding for the test probes such as goal 
must have a completely different origin. In our dual-task situation 
these items were activated by the acoustic stimulus (while seeing the 
picture of a sheep, the subject heard the word goal). Whether these 
probe words were also activated by the picture through mediated 
priming is irrelevant. Even if they were not activated at all, they 
still were valid as test items for the measurement o f  phonological 
activation o f  semantic alternatives (such as goat). Remember how 
we explained the effect o f  phonological similarity on lexical deci­
sion latency. If goat is phonologically active and goal is presented 
as lexical decision item, the activation o f  goat delays reduction of 
the cohort to the single element goal (in comparison with the con­
trol condition). This has nothing to do with whatever mediated 
activation that goal might receive from the picture. The latter may 
add to the effect, but it cannot be the sole or main cause. Hence the 
comparison between activation levels s • ƒ  and s + ƒ  is not the 
correct approach for comparing our experimental null effect to 
the above-chance occurrence o f  mixed errors. Therefore, we still
do not know whether we can find model parameters that can 
account both for the absence of phonological activation o f  seman­
tic alternatives in our experiments and for the above-chance occur­
rence o f  mixed errors.
But even on their own interpretation o f  our dual task, we must 
deny Dell and O ’Seaghdha’s (1991) contention that the spreading- 
activation model can produce the relevant priming effects. Their 
account is based on the so-called indexing problem. The subject 
must distinguish the probe from the name of the picture. For 
instance, the picture of a sheep produces some activation in the 
word node goat, and this makes it difficult for the system to recog­
nize that goat is also the lexical decision probe. According to this 
interpretation o f  the dual task, “lexical-decision probe processing 
is inhibited to the extent that the probe’s word node is already 
activated by the picture naming task” (Dell & O ’Seaghdha, 1991, 
p. 607). The more activated the word node that corresponds to the 
lexical probe is, the larger the inhibitory effect will be. But now 
observe our data in Figure 3:
1. For all stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) conditions, we find 
that phonological probes [sheet when the picture is one of a sheep) 
are more inhibited than identical probes (sheep). According to 
Dell and O ’Seaghdha’s (1991) one-shot model, this means that ƒ +  
s f > 1 + s f  for all SOAs. Hence ƒ  > 1, which is contrary to the 
model’s assumptions (0 ^  s, ƒ  < 1). (The same follows if we ignore 
the mixed node.)
2. For short and medium SOAs, we found about the same inhibi­
tion for identical (sheep) and semantic (wool) probes. This means 
that 1 + s f ^  s. But given the model’s assumptions, this holds only if 
s «  1 and ƒ «  0, which is contrary to the requirements of Observa­
tion 1 and contrary to the additionally imposed requirement that s 
and ƒ  are both less than 0.5. For long SOAs, identical probes are 
less inhibited than semantic probes; that is, 1 + s f < s. Hence it 
cannot be the case that both 0 < s < 1 and 0 ^  ƒ <  1; this violates the 
model’s assumptions. (If we ignore the mixed nodes, we get s «  1 
for the short and medium SOAs and 1 ^  s for the long SOA, violat­
ing the same requirements.)
It follows, given their own account o f  the dual task, that the 
model proposed by Dell and O ’Seaghdha (1991) cannot handle 
our data, whatever the choice of parameters. We are aware of the 
fact that both Observations 1 and 2 hinge on the findings in our 
identical (I) condition (i.e., in which the probe word is the name o f  
the object pictured). Dell and O ’Seaghdha may want to exempt 
that condition from the indexing interpretation o f  the dual task. 
That is arbitrary (especially because the I condition is so similar to 
the mixed case), but no more so than our own account o f  this 
condition (which we labeled as “by stipulation” in the original 
article). The point here is only that it is still a long shot for the 
connectionist model to generate both our SOA curves and the 
zero phonological activation o f  semantic alternatives. We are not 
saying that it is impossible, but it is still to be done.
Whatever the solution is going to be, a central issue will be what 
ratio o f  word node activation one should expect between semantic 
and alternative. In Dell and O ’Seaghdha’s (1991) formalization 
(and without regard to the mixed items— i.e., those that are both 
phonologically and semantically related to the target), this ratio is 
s. On the network account, one should expect the same ratio for 
the phonological node activation o f  those items. In Experiment 3, 
the short-SOA condition, we found an 88-ms effect for the phono­
logical activation o f  the target. (In terms o f  the current example, if 
the picture was one o f  a sheep, the test word sheet produced an
88-ms longer lexical decision latency than did an unrelated con­
trol word.) In Experiment 6, in which we measured the phonologi­
cal activation o f  semantic alternatives (such as goat when the tar­
get was sheep) by presenting a phonologically related test probe 
(such as goal), the average effect was - 2  ms. So what value should s
2 We express our appreciation for the extensive and constructive e- 
mail exchange that we could have with Gary Dell before the writing of 
the present comment and reply. We may not have reached complete 
agreement, but certainly we have moved considerably closer in the 
evaluation o f  our theoretical positions and o f  their empirical support.
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have in order to produce this substantial difference? In our article 
we argued that s cannot be tiny, and it certainly cannot be on Dell 
and O ’Seaghdha’s indexing account: We found a 106-ms effect 
when we used the semantic alternative itself as a test probe (in the 
example, goat). On the indexing account, this indicates a very 
substantial activation of the word node o f  the semantic alterna­
tive. Still, there was no trace of that alternative’s phonological 
activation. Although we agree that more empirical research is 
needed to estimate s, it is a priori unlikely, given Dell's (1986) 
model, that one would obtain a zero effect. The two-stage explana­
tion of that finding, however, is straightforward: only the selected 
item will be phonologically encoded.
The Absence of a Late Semantic Rebound
Dell and O’Seaghdha’s (1991) Figure 5 shows the semantic 
rebound that Dell’s (1986) model predicts for one choice of 
parameters. The critical case is the bump under “phonological” 
in the second panel. The word node is reactivated shortly after 
time instant 18 because of the external jolt that the phonologi­
cal nodes receive at that instant (see panel 3 under “phono­
logical”).
In our experiments, we found no evidence for a late reactiva­
tion of the target lemma. In the General Discussion, we wrote,
The question is whether a parameter estimation can be found that 
simultaneously satisfies two borderline conditions. The first one is 
that the feedback from the phonological to the lemma level is 
weak enough to prevent a measurable semantic reactivation of the 
target lemma. The second one is that the same feedback is still 
strong enough to explain the speech error phenomena for which it 
was proposed to start with. (Levelt et al., 1991, p. 139)
In their comment, Dell and O’Seaghdha (1991) interpret the 
semantic rebound in a different way than we did. For them, 
semantic rebound means reactivation of the semantic level 
nodes—that is, of the concepts. The relevant bump, then, is the 
one under “phonological” in the first panel. Clearly, that re­
bound is about zero. But is this the correct assignment of our 
experimental findings to the model? We do not think it is, but 
this needs some explanation.
In the experiment under concern (Experiment 3), we mea­
sured activation of the target lemma by presenting an associate 
as a lexical decision probe (e.g., wool when the target was sheep). 
At short (but not at medium or long) SOAs, we found a response 
delay for these probes (relative to unrelated control probes). The 
obvious question here is whether we measured conceptual-level 
(semantic) activation or lemma-level activation. This was tested 
in our Experiment 4, in which the subjects had a conceptual-le- 
vel task on the same items (a recognition task) that did not 
involve naming. If the effect for associated targets (such as wool) 
were to disappear, we would have evidence that we were mea­
suring at the lemma level, not at the conceptual level. That is 
what we obtained. In other words, the associates probed into 
the lemma level, and we found no reactivation at that level at 
late SOAs (i.e., when the target was phonologically active).
Dell and O’Seaghdha (1991) argue that their model is locally 
but not globally interactive. There is one-level-up feedback but 
little or no two-level-up feedback. We return shortly to this 
important conclusion, but we first notice that if our semantic 
probes indeed measure activation at the lemma level and not at 
the conceptual level, we have not been able to find evidence for
local interactiveness either. In their simulation, Dell and 
O’Seaghdha used parameters that are in the general range that 
Dell (1986, 1990) used for modeling of his evidence of speech 
error. Thus if the same choice of parameters had resulted in a 
sheer absence of semantic rebound, the conditions that we re­
quested in our General Discussion would have been fulfilled. 
But the rebound of lemma activation (Figure 5, second panel 
under “phonological”) was certainly not insubstantial, and this 
contrasts with the absolute absence of any rebound effect in our 
data.3 We admit, however, that our experimental procedure 
may not have been sensitive enough to pick up this degree of 
activation. Further experiments are needed to decide on this 
issue.
Where the interaction between Dell’s (1986) modeling and 
our experimentation has been most profitable is in the emerg­
ing recognition that the connectionist models of lexical access 
addressed in our article must incorporate a substantial degree 
of modularity. One could say that the lexical networks them­
selves should be relatively “cold” networks. Their pattern of 
performance is to a substantial degree produced by staged struc­
tural input from outside the network proper.
But at this point one should ask whether a “cold” network can 
indeed handle the speech error evidence. If interactiveness is 
largely restricted to occur between adjacent levels (i.e., between 
levels N, N  + 1, and N -  1), as Dell and O’Seaghdha (1991) 
proposed in their comment, then Dell’s (1986) model may not 
be able to account for the statistical biases in speech errors that 
it set out to explain (we are grateful to Paul Meyer for bringing 
this point to our attention). In contrast to the simplified model 
in Dell and O’Seaghdha’s Figure 4 (which generated the curves 
in their Figure 5), the original model had two intervening levels 
between the lemma level and the phonemic level: a level of 
syllable nodes and a level of syllable constituent nodes (clusters 
and rimes; cf. Dell 1986, Figure 2). If that network were a “cold” 
one with only local interactiveness between levels, then lexical 
bias and the repeated phoneme effect would disappear because 
they involve nonlocal interaction between the phonemic and 
the morphological (lemma) level.4
3 Gary Dell let us know that our long-SOA condition may be compa­
rable to Time Steps 28-35 in Dell and O ’Sheaghdha’s (1991) Figure 5. 
In that case the semantic rebound is to be found under “word” in the 
fourth panel, and that is clearly negligible. This solution may or may 
not work. The only way to find out is to try to generate our SOA curves 
on the basis o f  both this assumption and the indexing interpretation of 
our dual task. That is still to be done.
4 In our continuing exchanges, Gary Dell conceded this point and 
turned it into two nontrivial predictions. The first one is that the re­
peated phoneme effect should be a within-syllable effect. The second 
one is that the lexical bias effect is in fact a bias toward frequent sylla­
bles. The latter would be consistent with the fact that nobody has found 
any word-frequency effect in lexical bias (see Dell, 1990). (Both predic­
tions hold only if the level o f  syllable constituents is removed from 
Dell’s 1986 model). Dell suggested that if these predictions are not 
substantiated, both levels o f  syllable representation may have to be 
removed. Syllable structure effects could then be adduced to the con­
struction of frames, or— in parellel distributed processing fashion— 
emerge from existing correlations.
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Concluding Remarks
Although Dell and O’Seaghdha’s (1991) comment has sub­
stantially clarified the issues that our original article addressed, 
it has not yet produced the full “balancing act” required to 
reconcile our findings with the speech error data that Dell’s 
(1986) model was designed to explain. Still, we do not exclude 
the possibility that the act may eventually be feasible. Here, 
however, we want to return to the issue raised in our introduc­
tion. The ultimate test for a process model, we argued, is how it 
accounts for the normal process.
In that normal process, lexical selection and phonological 
encoding fulfill wildly different functions. The former involves 
fast search in a huge lexicon for an appropriate item; the latter 
creates an articulatory program for that item. Any feedback 
from the latter to the former level only makes the system more 
error prone than necessary. Modularity, one could say, is na­
ture’s protection against error.
So what could be the functional sense of the interactive feed­
back in Dell’s (1986) model? Clearly, Dell introduced it in order 
to account for statistical properties of speech error distribu­
tions, particularly the relative rate of mixed errors, the lexical 
bias effect, the repeated phoneme effect, and so forth (see Dell, 
1988). But it is hardly satisfactory to say that the interactive 
feedback is there in order to produce special kinds of speech 
error.
Dell’s (1988) discussion of this issue alludes to one other possi­
bility: that the feedback is there for the network to serve as a 
word recognition device as well. That makes good sense. There 
is nothing in speech production that specifically requires inter­
active feedback. But if the same lexical network subserves 
speech comprehension, then two-way traffic is unavoidable. A 
certain kind of error proneness is then a natural consequence of 
the unitary lexicon. Allport (1984), reviewing the case for a 
unitary lexicon, concluded that the study of language pathology 
has not (yet) produced convincing evidence against that notion 
(such as cases of double dissociation between phonological pro­
cessing in comprehension and production of speech.5 
MacKay’s (1987) node structure theory involves a proposal for 
such a two-way lexicon. Unfortunately, unlike Dell’s model, 
MacKays model is only a qualitative one and is therefore not 
easily evaluated against process data in speech production and 
comprehension. Levelt (1989), however, argued against the 
node structure theory on the grounds that it cannot account for 
the often long delays in a speaker’s detection of a self-produced
error. Still, it is only fair to say that the case of a unitary lexicon 
is as yet completely undecided. In fact, our own model of the 
dual task implies that there is substantial lexical interaction 
between production and comprehension.
Our conclusion is this: The two-stage theory is in full agree­
ment with our reaction time data. We recognize that error dis­
tributions should eventually also be accounted for by a process 
model, but the ultimate testing ground is in the model’s han­
dling of normal processing. As far as speech error biases are 
concerned, the two-stage theory treats them as postlexical ef­
fects, originating in a postlexical editing device (the speech 
comprehension system). As far as the feed-forward and two-way 
connectionist theories are concerned, it is now time to hunt for 
normal processing evidence in their support. We have not 
found it in our experiments, but perhaps, as the saying goes, he 
that seeketh findeth.
5 Howard and Franklin’s (1987) conduction aphasic patient M K may
represent such a case of lexical dissociation.
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